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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASING
ON OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
LANDS ACT: The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
holds that the Department of the Interior is required to fully con-
sider alternative operating orders in Outer Continental Shelf oil and
gas leasing programs. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978 specifically allows the Secretary of the Interior to
terminate Outer Continental Shelf leases for environmental reasons.
State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
BACKGROUND
President Nixon stated in January, 1974, that as part of "Project
Independence"' he was ordering the Secretary of the Interior (Secre-
tary) "to increase the acreage leased on the Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) to 10 million acres beginning in 1975. ... "2 Mr. Nixon also
stated that there would be "no decision on leasing on the OCS in the
... Gulf of Alaska until the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) completes its current environmental study of those areas." 3
This CEQ study, released in April of 1974, concluded that, of the
regions studied, OCS development in the Eastern Gulf of Alaska
would pose the highest level of environmental risks.4 The Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) also expressed criticism of the pro-
posed inclusion of Alaska OCS areas in the leasing schedule.'
The Department of the Interior (DOI) agreed that development in
the Gulf of Alaska would be "highly hazardous."' 6 However, the DOI
1. The name given to the former President's program designed to free the U.S. from
dependence on foreign sources of petroleum. See, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1309,
1317 (1973).
2. 10 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 69, 84 (1974).
3. Id.
4. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, O.C.S. OIL AND GAS-AN EN-
VIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, at 6 (1974).
5. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 3 ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL TRADEOFFS: RELATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RANKING OF
PROPOSED OFFSHORE CONTINENTAL SHELF AREAS ON THE BASIS OF IMPACTS
OF OIL SPILLS (1975).
6. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 2 DRAFT PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 98, 401 (1974).
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scheduled the Gulf of Alaska areas for leasing earlier than any of the
regions of lower risk which were analyzed in the CEQ study.' When
thy DOI published its final environmental impact statement (EIS),
the document was submitted to the EPA under Section 309 of the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.8 Pursuant to the provisions of
Section 309, the EPA Administrator determined that the proposed
action was environmentally unsafe and urged that the sale be de-
layed.9 The EPA then referred the matter to the CEQ which recom-
mended, inter alia, proceeding with a lease sale of only "the north-
easternmost zone of the original sale proposal."'  This area
amounted to 150,000 acres and was, in the CEQ's view, "both highly
promising in oil and gas potential and relatively low in vulnerability
to environmental damage."' 1
Subsequently, the Secretary deleted some 700,000 acres from the
sale, stating that these were "by far the most risky tracts." 1 2 Later,
he eliminated 92,000 more acres, which had been identified as areas
of particular environmental concern, from the lease sale.' '
The DOI held the sale (Sale No. 39) as scheduled. Before doing so,
it had weighed the relative value of delays to complete ongoing en-
vironmental studies. It had concluded that such studies would not
appreciably alter knowledge of the hazards of oil and gas develop-
ment in the Gulf of Alaska." 4 The Secretary, in making the decision
to go ahead with the sale, stated that the operating orders, safety
requirements, and lease stipulations developed by the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
would tolerably lessen the environmental dangers.1 ' The total area
of tracts for which bids were received and accepted in the lease sale
was about 410,000 acres.
STATE OF ALASKA v. ANDRUS
The State of Alaska, the City of Yakutat, the United Fishermen of
Alaska, and the Cordova District Fisheries Union brought suit in the
7. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 3 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
LEASE SALE NO. 39, app. 1-1 (1975).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-7 (1976). This section requires the EPA Administrator to examine
the environmental impacts of federal actions governed by NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321-4361
(1976), and refer the matter to the CEQ.
9. See, State of Alaska v. Kleppe, 9 E.R.C. 1497 (D.D.C. 1976).
10. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 472.
14. Id at 471. See, notice of Sale No. 39 appearing in 41 Fed. Reg. 10, 792 (1976).
15. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a
preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants, the Secretary of the
Interior and the Director of the BLM, from holding the lease sale.I 6
The trial judge denied a motion for a preliminary injunction and the
sale was held as scheduled. Plaintiffs then sought a declaration that
the DOI violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)' '
by holding Sale No. 39. They claimed that the EIS which had been
prepared for the sale was inadequate. The trial court upheld the EIS
and plaintiffs appealed.' '
A. The Issue of Delaying the Sale
Appellants raised three major environmental issues in their appeal.
First, they argued that the information available to the Secretary
was, as a matter of law, insufficient to support a decision to proceed
with the sale at that time. Alternatively, they claimed that even if the
Secretary had enough information regarding environmental effects to
support Sale No. 39 in 1976, the Secretary failed to adequately
respond to. the suggestions by the EPA, the CEQ, and others that the
sale be delayed.
An agency's primary responsibility under NEPA is to predict the
environmental consequences of its proposed action before it pro-
ceeds with that action and to fully ascertain those environmental
effects. 9 Chief Judge Bazelon, writing for the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, noted that there must be a point in
each case where the environmental data is sufficient for agency
action regulated by NEPA, even if that information does not consti-
tute complete knowledge of potential environmental ramifica-
tions.2 0 If the responsible decision-maker has considered the costs of
proceeding without more complete information, and has decided
that such possible environmental consequences are "outweighed by
the benefits of proceeding with the project without further
delay,"' I neither a court nor an environmental agency can substitute
its judgment for that of the decision-maker. 2 2 Thus, the appeals
court found that the Secretary was not required to delay the sale
until the completion of ongoing studies.
16. State of Alaska v. Kleppe, 9 E.R.C. 1497 (D.D.C. 1976).
17. 42 U.S.C. §4321 et. seq. (1976).
18. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
19. Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. A.E.C., 481 F.2d 1079, 1092
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
20. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Jicarilla
Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1975).
21. Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
22. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976).
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Under NEPA, the Secretary, though not required to delay the sale,
was obligated to fully advert to that alternative before going forward
with the sale.2 3 Appellants' corollary argument was that the Secre-
tary did not sufficiently consider the alternative of delay in the EIS
for Sale No. 39.2 ' The EIS briefly discussed the alternative of delay,
but did not deal with the costs of such a delay.' Section 102(2)(C)
of NEPA2'6 requires a detailed statement of altneratives to proposed
agency action. And compliance with this provision must "amount to
a full, good faith consideration of the environment." 2 7 NEPA's re-
quirements are designed to guarantee that environmental values are
fully considered in agency decision-making.2 I Although an agency
must therefore examine alternatives and their respective costs, the
court determined that, as a general proposition, under NEPA an
agency has "reasonable discretion to decide when it has sufficient
information to choose intelligently between alternative courses of
action that affect the environment." 2 9
Whether the Secretary had adequately considered the alternative
of delaying the sale was not decided, however. The court felt it
useless to rule on this issue since the period of postponement recom-
mended by the EPA and the CEQ had by that time passed and most
of the data thought necessary for the sale decision had supposedly
already been collected.
B. The Operating Orders
The Outer Continental Lands Act (OCS Act)3" charges the Secre-
tary with administration of an oil and gas leasing program in OCS
areas. This responsibility is subdivided between the BLM, which has
the duty of administering the leasing of OCS tracts, 3' and the USGS,
which is responsible for overseeing lessees' activities on the leased
areas.3 2 The USGS, in fulfilling its duty, enforces those operating
regulations set out in the Code of Federal Regulations and issues
23. NEPA, § 102(2)(C), (E), 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C), (E) (1976).
24. § 102(2)(C) of NEPA states that an EIS must contain a "detailed statement" of
"alternatives to the proposed action."
25. Supra note 7, Vol. 11, 676-79, Vol. III, 114.
26. Supra note 23.
27. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. A.E.C., 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
28. For an excellent discussion of NEPA's applicability to OCS leasing, see McDermott,
Expanded Offshore Leasing and the Mandates of NEPA, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 531
(1977).
29. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
30. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et. seq. (1970).
31. 43 C.F.R. 3300, et seq. (1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 49, 983 (1977).
32. 30 C.F.R. 250.1, et seq. (1977); See, 41 Fed. Reg. 10, 105 (1976), 43 Fed. Reg. 43
3883, 43, 3889 (1978).
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precise "operating orders" for every area in which drilling is anti-
cipated. Such orders determine the way in which exploration and
development are conducted and detail the environmental and safety
standards the lessee will be obliged to meet. The operating orders for
Sale No. 39 were summarily outlined in the EIS for the sale.3
Appellants' second major contention was that the DOI was re-
quired to assess alternatives to those operating orders which were
actually chosen. The State of Alaska observed that determinations as
to how OCS operations are to be managed are at least as important as
decisions regarding whether or not OCS development is allowed at all
in a specific area.
In response to this argument, the court first stated that the Secre-
tary would not be required to compile a separate EIS dealing with
the operating orders. Additionally, the opinion noted that the Secre-
tary has discretion "to consider the OCS orders within the context of
the EIS for Sale No. 39. " "3 Thus, the Secretary's decision to delay
consideration of the impact of the orders was not disturbed by the
court.
Moving to the heart of this issue, Judge Bazelon phrased the
crucial question: "While the Secretary could thus consider the im-
pact of the Orders within the context of the Sale No. 39 EIS, the
more important issue is whether the 'consideration' given to the
Orders in that EIS was adequate."'3
As previously noted, the EIS for Sale No. 39 only described the
proposed and adopted orders without assessing their environmental
impact vis-a-vis other orders which might have been selected. The
Secretary claimed that he was not required to more fully consider
the adopted orders and alternatives since "these orders are nothing
more than methods of mitigating potential adverse environmental
impacts and promoting safety ...36 However, the operating orders,
the court wrote, were "not bestowed by the Secretary ... out of
sheer beneficence toward the environment." 3 Instead, they were a
basic means by which the Secretary sought to fulfill his mission to
keep untoward effects of the lease sale upon the Gulf of Alaska to a
minimum.3  In fact, DOI's election to go forward with the sale
without delay was founded upon the assertion of protective op-
erating orders.3 9
33. Supra note 7, Vol. II at 552, 679.
34. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
35. Id. at 477-478.
36. Id. at 478.
37. Ia
38. Id.
39. Id. at 479.
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Where operating orders are expressly intended by an agency "as
part of the basic premise for the kind of consideration of adverse
environmental impact that is mandated by NEPA," the court said
that promulgation of those protective orders "must be conducted
with full consideration of environmental consequences and alter-
natives." 4 0 The court did not detail what kind of consideration by
an agency would satisfy such a test, except to observe that a "rule of
reason" governs evaluation of alternatives to a proposed action. At a
minimum, though, the court stated that an agency must evaluate
plausible alternative operating orders suggested by comments on the
agency's own proposed orders. Having ascertained DOI's respon-
sibility to conduct such an assessment of alternative orders, the court
asked that the Interior Department perform such an evaluation.
However, the court refused to set aside on this basis, saying that even
had the Secretary properly considered alternative orders he never-
theless could have decided to conduct the sale.
C. Termination Clauses
Finally, appellants argued that environmental risks occasioned by
OCS drilling in the Gulf of Alaska could have been controlled to a
fair extent had the DOI included "termination clauses" in leases it
sold. Such clauses would give the Secretary power to cancel a lease if
environmental dangers subsequently arose during exploration or
development. Appellants urged that the DOI's failure to consider the
inclusion of such clauses violated NEPA, since such clauses con-
stituted an alternative to the proposed sale.
The Secretary took the position that under the OCS Act leases can
be terminated only if the lessee is guilty of some wrongdoing. He
based his argument on two provisions of this act. First, the con-
tinuance of a lease is conditioned upon the lessee's compliance with
those regulations issued and in force upon the date of the lease.
Also, the act states that a lease can be terminated if the lessee does
not comply with the provisions of the act, of the lease, or of the
regulations in effect at the time the lease was granted. 4 2 Thus, the
Secretary maintained, these provisions were the only means by which
he could terminate a lease.4 3
However, the Secretary had not based his argument upon the
40. Id.
41. 43 U.S.C. § 133 4 (a)(2) (1970).
42. Id. § 1334(b)(1), (2).
43. The OCS Act provided that leases "contain such rental provisions and such other
terms and provisions as the Secretary may prescribe at the time of offering the area for
lease." 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4) (1970).
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relevant issue. The question was, in the court's view, not whether the
Secretary had the power to cancel a lease even if it did not contain a
termination clause. Rather, the pertinent inquiry was whether the
Secretary could include a termination clause in OCS leases offered
for sale. Looking to the legislative history of the OCS Act,4  the
opinion noted that there was a distinct congressional intent to give
the Secretary "broad discretion in the administration of the OCS
leasing program."' 4  The court then opined that Congress intended
that the leases must be terminable if the lessee has been guilty of
wrongdoing, but that the Secretary was not thereby prohibited from
contracting with lessees to make OCS leases cancellable for other
reasons.
The cancellation provision of the Mineral Leasing Act,4 6 which
was very like the OCS Act's termination section, was found in
Boesche v. Udall4 ' not to constitute the exclusive means by which
the DOI can cancel a lease granted under the Mineral Leasing Act. In
Boesche, the Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether the
Secretary had the power to administratively cancel a lease which had
been issued in violation of the Mineral Leasing Act, even though the
lessee had not been guilty of wrongdoing. The opinion determined
that, under the Act, Congress had reserved the fee interest in leased
areas in the United States. Therefore, the Court found that the Secre-
tary has general managerial authority over such lands and that he
thus has a general administrative power of termination. The Court
also stated that the Mineral Leasing Act "was intended to expand,
not contract, the Secretary's control over the mineral lands of the
United States . . ." I However, in Boesche, the Secretary had
claimed no power to cancel a lease where there were no post-lease
violations of lease terms; and the Court noted that the Mineral Leas-
ing Act's provisions provided the exclusive means of termination
based on post-lease events.
Judge Bazelon drew an analogy between the Mineral Leasing Act
and the OCS Act, there being no case law exactly on point. He
observed that both pieces of legislation were intended to settle issues
of federal versus state control over certain resource development and
exploration, and both acts substantially expanded the Secretary of
the Interior's authority. Thus, the D.C. Court of Appeals found that
44. See, e.g., H. REP. NO. 1084, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 86 (1976); H. REP. NO. 413, 83d
Cong. 1st Sess. (1953); S. REP. NO. 411, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1953).
45. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
46. 30 U.S.C. § 188 (1976).
47. 373 U.S.C. §472 (1963).
48. Id at §481.
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"it would be surprising to find in the (OCS) Act's cancellation pro-
visions a limitation on the Secretary's authority to prescribe the
terms and conditions that should be included in each lease."'4 9
In Union Oil Co. v. Morton,"0 the Ninth Circuit held that the
Secretary does not have the power to cancel a lease under the OCS
Act, even in the face of an environmental hreat. That court found
that the Secretary's open-ended suspension and order denying oil and
gas lessees permission to build a drilling platform in the Santa
Barbara Channel, which was allegedly necessary for the complete
exercise of their lease rights, constituted a taking which was not
expressly or implicitly authorized by Congress.
The D.C. Court of Appeals noted this decision, but made it clear
that it was not deciding whether the Secretary has the power to
terminate an OCS lease if that lease does not contain a cancellation
provision. The court found only that the Secretary has, under the
OCS Act and as part of his "general managerial powers," the author-
ity to decide which clauses are included in OCS leases offered for sale
and that he does have the discretion to include termination clauses in
such leases. Given that the Secretary has this power, the court con-
cluded that "there can be little question that the possibility of in-
cluding such clauses in the leases at issue here does constitute an
'alternative to the proposed action' that should have been evaluated
in the EIS and considered by the Secretary." ' '
But, since cancellation of the lease sale, which had already taken
place, would create legal problems and would be inappropriate, the
court refused to grant appellants' petition for that remedy. However,
the court entered a declaratory judgment to the effect that termina-
tion clauses should have been considered in the EIS.
APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
An industry trade group, the Western Oil and Gas Association
(Association), having intervened as a defendant in the case from the
beginning, petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. The Association alleged that the appeals court's opinion
conflicted with years of uniform statutory construction to the effect
that the DOI could not terminate leases where the lessee is without
fault, except in return for the government's payment of fair com-
pensation.
49. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
50. 512 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
51. State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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A. OCS Lands Act Amendments of 1978
On September 18, 1978, President Carter signed into law the OCS
Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (Amendments).' 2 Perhaps one of
the most important provisions of the Amendments is that giving the
Secretary the power to cancel an OCS lease or permit for environ-
mental reasons. 5 3 The cancellation procedure is undertaken in two
steps. First, if there is a threat of serious harm to life, property,
mineral deposits, or to the marine, coastal, or human environment,
the Secretary can temporarily suspend operations creating the threat.
Next, if after a hearing the Secretary decides that continued opera-
tions under the lease would work serious harm to the environment,
national security, or life, and that the threat of harm will not ap-
preciably diminish within a reasonable time, and finally that the
advantages of cancellation outweigh those of continuing a lease in
force, he may cancel the potentially harmful lease. With respect to
any lease so cancelled, the Amendments entitle the affected lessee to
be compensated for the loss of his lease.
The Amendments require that the Secretary conduct a study of
areas included in oil and gas lease sales.' ' Such studies are to assess
the environmental impacts on the human, marine, and coastal en-
vironments of the OCS and of coastal areas which could be affected
by development in the region. Also, the Secretary may gather addi-
tional environmental data during development of OCS areas in order
to detect ecological changes in those regions. All studies are to be
conducted in cooperation with affected states.5 I Executives of af-
fected state and local governments may give recommendations to the
Secretary regarding the size, timing, or location of a proposed lease
sale or with respect to proposed plans for development and produc-
tion. If such recommendations provide for a reasonable balance
between the national and local interests, they may be accepted by
the Secretary. In addition, the DOI is now authorized to engage in
joint planning, review, and surveillance of OCS activities with local
governmental entities.
Significantly, the Amendments state that the "best available and
safest technologies which the Secretary determines to be eco-
nomically feasible" are to be used where the failure of a particular
system could lead to damaging safety, health, or environmental
52. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-373 (S.9)
92 Stat. 629-698, reprinted in [ 19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2856.
53. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 636-640, amending 43 U.S.C. §1334 (1970).
54. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 653-654,addingnewsection 43 U.S.C. § 1346.
55. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 652-653, adding new section 43 U.S.C. §1345.
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effects.' 6 All safety and environmental regulations under the Act are
to be enforced by the Secretary, the Coast Guard, and the Secretary
of the Army.
Citizens' suits are expressly provided for. Anyone with a valid legal
interest may sue in a civil action to enforce compliance with the OCS
Act.' I The United States, a governmental body, or any other person
can be named as defendant. Specific guidelines and procedures for
such actions are set forth in the Amendments.
Remand
The petitioners and the State of Alaska suggested to the Supreme
Court that the portion of this case dealing with termination clauses
was mooted by the 1978 changes in the OCS Act. On October 30,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case, vacated the portion
of the appeals court's opinion dealing with termination clauses, and
remanded the case to the U.S. District Court in the District of
Columbia for dismissal of the pertinent parts of the plaintiffs' com-
plaint.5 8
CONCLUSION
Obviously, a federal agency responsible for administering projects
in a given field should be considered a knowledgeable authority in
that area. Hence, it is proper that agencies such as the Department of
the Interior retain their discretion to decide when they have enough
ecological information to prudently proceed with a proposed action.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia felt it im-
portant to state that an agency, though having such discretion, must
thoroughly assess the costs and benefits of proceeding without
further environmental data-as opposed to delaying action until more
information is gathered. The appeals court did not have to make a
definitive statement on the matter since the suggested time for study
had already elapsed. Perhaps this was best, since such decisions are
properly left to responsible agencies with expertise.
The court seemed to indicate that NEPA is more than simply a
procedural statute. An agency may not simply go through the
motions. According to this opinion, an agency must exhaustively and
accurately examine alternatives to the proposed actions. Real jus-
tification must be shown for agency projects. Agencies must also
consider viable suggestions as to the actual operation of those
56. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat.-654-655, adding new section 43 U.S.C. § 1347.
57. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 657-658, adding new section 43 U.S.C. § 1349.
58. Sub nom Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Alaska, -U.S. -(1978).
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projects. This is particularly so when, as in this case, the decision to
proceed with a program has been predicated upon the protection
offered by strict operating orders.
Additionally, the OCS Amendments provide for cancellation of
leases even when termination clauses are not included in lease agree-
ments. The federal government now has a valuable new tool with
which to avoid environmental damage. Since the DOI need not have
complete knowledge of environmental hazards before leasing OCS
lands, and termination clauses and protective operating orders may
not always suffice to prevent extensive ecological damage, much
harm could result if destructive OCS development could not be
halted. The new OCS cancellation measure is the missing link-a way
to quickly stop polluting activities in the event other mechanisms are
not adequate. And, the constitutional "taking without compen-
sation" problems which had arisen in this context previous to the
passage of the Amendments have been solved. Congress provided for
compensation in such instances, recognizing that the prior lack of
payment provisions created legal entanglements.
It is worthwhile to note the role of citizens' groups and state and
local governments in enforcing consideration of ecological values.
Here, a state and a local government joined with concerned fisher-
men in a lawsuit to vindicate the failure of traditional administrative
procedures to properly take account of human and environmental
values in decision-making. The OCS Amendments, in realization of
the fact that those closest and most affected by federal actions must
be given a voice in federal decision-making, mandate that more atten-
tion be paid to those voices. The Amendments also reflect Congres-
sional recognition of le droit du plus fort that area residents can bring
to bear to ensure proper OCS leasing and administration. It is im-
portant that such groups bring their complaints into a court of law so
that their viewpoints and grievances can properly be considered.
The appeals court's decision not only strengthens the effect of
NEPA's environmental review procedures, but also provides agencies
with much needed guidelines for OCS lands management. One would
certainly tend to agree with Rep. John Murphy (D-NY) I that the
OCS Amendments are "... one of the key ... environmental
measures of the 95th Congress." '6 0
HOWARD THOMAS
59. Chairman of House Ad Hoc Select Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf.
60. 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 972 (1978).
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